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Abstract
In many markets ¯rms set posted prices which are potentially negotiable. We analyze the
optimal marketing mix of pricing and bargaining when price takers buy at posted prices but
bargainers attempt to negotiate discounts. The optimal bargaining strategy involves the ¯rms
o®ering bargainers randomly-sized discounts. Competing ¯rms keep posted prices high to weaken
the bargainers' outside option, thus forgoing the chance to increase pro¯ts from price takers by
undercutting their rival. A range of posted price equilibria are possible, and the highest price
in the range increases when the proportion of bargainers goes up or the bargainers become less
skilled. We consider how ¯rms and competition authorities might encourage more consumers
to bargain and determine the conditions under which each would choose to do so. Finally,
we study the ¯rms' strategic decision about how much bargaining discretion sales sta® should
be allowed. Both ¯rms allowing full bargaining °exibility is always an equilibrium { but not
always the most pro¯table one. If there are enough bargainers, both ¯rms committing to only
matching the rival's posted price is also an equilibrium: price matching moderates competition,
thus raising pro¯ts.
Keywords: Posted prices; list prices; bargaining; negotiation; haggling; discounts; outside op-
tion; price takers; competition policy; price matching.
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1 Introduction
Retailers often set posted prices which are potentially negotiable. In this paper we want to
discover the optimal marketing mix of posted prices and discounts o® them in markets in which
some consumers attempt to bargain while others dislike the notion of bargaining and instead
buy at the posted prices. In particular, we would like to answer the following types of question:
1. How does the presence of the bargainers a®ect the posted prices that the ¯rms choose to
set and the pro¯ts that the ¯rms earn?
2. What level of discounts should a ¯rm o®er bargainers as part of its marketing mix?
3. When should ¯rms and competition authorities encourage more consumers to bargain and
how might they attempt to do so?
4. How are the optimal pricing strategies a®ected by the bargainers' level of skill?
5. If the ¯rms are able commit to limit the bargaining discretion of their sales sta®, will they
choose to restrict the availability of discounts?
In the United Kingdom (UK) discounts on big ticket items such as cars and package holidays
have been available for some time. The Competition Commission (2000) report on the UK car
market found that discounts o® the public list price were common, large on average and highly
variable (see in particular Appendices 7.1 and 7.2). For example, private buyer discounts o® Ford
models in 1997/98 averaged 11%, discounts o® Vauxhauls averaged 12% and discounts o® Fiats
averaged 10%, with some discounts in the 30-40% range in each case. Yet many consumers
received no reduction at all (e.g., 13% in the case of Ford). A similar pattern holds for the
automobile market in the United States: according to Goldberg (1996, p. 641), \the data reveal
substantial variation in dealer discounts, a large fraction of which cannot be explained just by
¯nancing, or model- and time-speci¯c variables". The O±ce of Fair Trading (2004) report on
the UK estate agency (realtor) market found that almost 50% of house sellers using an estate
agent had tried to negotiate fees, with 80% of those receiving a reduction (Section 4.48).
With the advent of the credit crunch, the range of products over which negotiation is possible
appears to be expanding, raising the salience of our research question. In a story entitled \Shops
cave in on hagglers in `souk Britain' ", The Sunday Times (2008) reported that: \Haggling has
hit the high street. Jewellers, shoe shops, travel agents and electrical retailers are o®ering price
cuts of up to 60% to shoppers prepared to negotiate the prices quoted on labels... A spokesman
for Which? magazine said: It would seem that where people have the con¯dence to ask for a
discount, they will get it. The classic British reserve stops us from haggling but you've got
nothing to lose." The Daily Telegraph (2009) story \Haggle your way to a bargain" reported
that: \Items such as washing machines and sofas often have high mark-ups, leaving room for
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reduction. Independent retailers have always been open to negotiation, but now chain stores
are getting in on the act, too. Carol Ratcli®e of the retail sector analysts Verdict Research says:
The big chains are being very responsive to consumers looking to bag a bargain... In America,
we see a lot of haggling { we Brits are more shy because we don't want to cause o®ence, but we
are getting used to it. It does no harm to ask!"
In our price-setting model two competing ¯rms simultaneously set posted prices, which
become common knowledge. `Price takers' dislike bargaining, or don't appreciate that discounts
are possible, and so buy at the posted prices. `Bargainers', on the other hand, approach at least
one of the ¯rms to ask for a better price than the one posted. To model bargaining, we adapt
Burdett and Judd (1983)'s non-sequential search framework. In Burdett and Judd there are
no posted prices and consumers are o®ered quotes from a probability distribution. Similarly to
Burdett and Judd, we ¯nd that the ¯rms o®er bargainers quotes of a random size; the twist
in our analysis is that the upper bound of this distribution is determined endogenously by the
posted prices that are set for the price takers. As part of its optimal marketing mix, each ¯rm
o®ers bargainers discounts of an unpredictable size. The ¯rms trade o® the pro¯ts when pricing
high from bargainers who don't approach the rival ¯rm to ask for a better price against the
greater probability when pricing low of selling to bargainers who also approach the rival.
The presence of the bargainers in the market a®ects the optimal marketing strategy in
interesting and important ways. Of course, bargainers succeed in negotiating discounts o® the
posted prices as each ¯rm is worried that a bargainer will be tempted by a lower o®er from the
rival ¯rm. However, bargaining also impacts on the ¯rms' incentives when they set their posted
prices. The ¯rms understand that the higher the posted prices, the worse the outside option
for the bargainers, and so the higher the average price that the bargainers pay. If the posted
prices are too high, though, each ¯rm has too big an incentive to undercut the rival's posted
price to win price taker market share at a high price. The presence of the bargainers thus allows
posted prices to rise; in fact, we ¯nd that they permit a range of equilibrium posted prices to
exist. Our results thus provide a possible justi¯cation for the ¯ndings of Cason et al. (2003),
whose experiments show that when consumers can haggle below a posted price, prices tend to
be higher and e±ciency lower (Davis and Holt, 1994, present similar experimental ¯ndings).
When the proportion of bargainers in the market increases, the highest possible equilibrium
posted price rises as each ¯rm's incentive to undercut the rival's posted price to win price takers
is weakened. Assuming the ¯rms succeed in raising their posted prices towards the new highest
possible equilibrium, those consumers who remain price takers pay higher posted prices and
those who were already bargaining also pay higher prices on average as their outside option in
the bargaining process becomes worse. However, those consumers who switch to bargaining get
better prices as they now receive discounts o® the posted price.
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We show that if, through marketing, a ¯rm can make almost all consumers bargainers, then
its pro¯ts are maximized. With barely any price takers, the competitive pressure on posted
prices is removed, allowing these to rise toward the full consumer willingness to pay. The ¯rms
thus increase their bargaining pro¯ts as the outside option for bargainers becomes so poor.
We also show that pro¯ts are not monotonic in the proportion of bargainers. In the paper we
determine when exactly ¯rms and competition authorities might attempt to alter the proportion
of bargainers incrementally.1
Finally, we extend our analysis to consider the case where ¯rms are able to commit strate-
gically to limit the bargaining discretion of their sales sta®. In an initial stage the ¯rms choose
simultaneously the level of discretion to allow, either permitting full discretion to bargain below
the posted price (as in the benchmark model analyzed in the rest of the paper) or commit-
ting their sales sta® to only matching the rival's posted price when asked for a discount (price
matching). We ¯nd that both ¯rms allowing full discretion to bargain is always an equilibrium.
By deviating to price matching, competition for the bargainers becomes less intense, but the
deviator loses market share among the bargainers. If there are enough bargainers, both ¯rms
committing in advance to price matching can also be sustained as an equilibrium: when the
¯rms play such an equilibrium, they succeed in moderating competition for both bargainers and
price takers, and so raise their pro¯ts.
Related Literature
Our work adds to the limited amount of literature which looks at the impact of bargaining
when some consumers take posted prices as given. Like us, Korn (2007), Raskovich (2007)
and Gill and Thanassoulis (2009) ¯nd that an increase in the proportion of bargainers can
raise posted prices. In Korn (2007)'s monopoly setting, the bargaining process is not modeled:
bargainers are assumed to negotiate a ¯xed proportionate discount o® the price-cost margin.
In the absence of bargaining the monopolist can set the monopoly price, which means that, in
contrast to our results, the presence of bargainers always reduces pro¯ts. In Raskovich (2007)
a big enough proportion of bargainers causes posted prices to jump from marginal cost to the
monopoly price. The mechanism which raises the posted prices is di®erent from that in our
model: ¯rms setting higher posted prices are assumed to be weaker bargainers and so are more
attractive to bargaining consumers. Gill and Thanassoulis (2009) present a quantity-setting
model where a Cournot auctioneer sets a binding public list price o® which bargainers negotiate
discounts. Bargaining is modeled as in this paper, although with quantity-setting the list price
equilibrium is unique. These papers have a di®erent focus to ours: in particular, none considers
how the average prices paid by consumers and pro¯ts earned by ¯rms change with the proportion
of bargainers, so they do not address whether ¯rm marketing strategy should be used to in°uence
1Section 6 gives an example of an information campaign launched by the O±ce of Fair Trading to encourage
bargaining in the UK estate agency (realtor) market.
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the number of bargainers; nor do these papers consider sales force bargaining discretion.2
Like us, Desai and Purohit (2004) consider whether ¯rms will commit to restricting bar-
gaining when some consumers take posted prices as given but the haggling type of consumer
bargains. This important contribution to the literature focuses on whether the ¯rms will choose
to commit to never bargain with the hagglers. Unlike in our set-up, when both ¯rms choose to
haggle the posted prices are una®ected by the presence of the hagglers as they are never e®ective
outside options for the haggling type. Thus the ¯rms can use a haggling policy to separate the
markets for the hagglers and non-hagglers and price discriminate e®ectively.
Much of the rest of the literature exploring bargaining in consumer markets examines the
choice between committing to a ¯xed price and allowing consumers to bargain in the absence
of a posted price (see e.g., Bester, 1993, Wang, 1995, Arnold and Lippman, 1998, Camera and
Delacroix, 2004 and Myatt and Rasmusen, 2009). There is also a small literature on bargaining
below a posted price when all consumers bargain (e.g., Chen and Rosenthal, 1996a, 1996b and
Camera and Selcuk, 2009).
Finally, as we ¯nd that both ¯rms committing to only match the rival's posted price mod-
erates competition and raises pro¯ts, we add to the literature which shows that price-matching
guarantees can reduce the competitive pressures on ¯rms (see for instance Moorthy and Winter,
2006, and the references therein).
Plan of the paper
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the model; Section 3 analyzes the ¯rms'
optimal bargaining strategy given the posted prices; Section 4 derives the equilibrium choice of
posted prices; Section 5 conducts comparative statics on pro¯ts and consumer surplus; Section 6
considers how and when ¯rms and competition authorities might in°uence the proportion of
bargainers; Section 7 studies how much bargaining discretion the ¯rms will allow their sales
sta®; Section 8 concludes; and the Appendix collects the proofs.
2 The Model
Two competing ¯rms are located at the ends of a Hotelling (1929) line of length 1 with a uniform
density of consumers along it. Firm a is located at 0, the left end of the line, and ¯rm b at 1, the
right end. The ¯rms have the same constant marginal cost of production, which we normalize
to 0, and have no ¯xed costs. As in Hotelling (1929) every consumer purchases exactly one
unit and the market is always covered. The ¯rms simultaneously choose a publicly posted price
li ¸ 0, i 2 fa; bg. The posted prices are assumed to be binding: a ¯rm can't refuse to sell at its
2Gill and Thanassoulis (2009) were able to analyze how consumer surplus changes with the proportion of
bargainers in the limit where all bargainers seek more than one second quote or none do, while Raskovich (2007)
does note that if the ¯rms committed to o®ering no discounts at all in his model, posted prices would fall to
marginal cost.
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chosen posted price. We de¯ne l to be the lower of the two posted prices, i.e., l ´ min fla; lbg.
A proportion ¹ 2 (0; 1) of the consumers are `price takers', i.e., consumers who do not seek
to bargain, instead taking the posted prices as given. The price takers have a standard linear
Hotelling `transport cost' with parameter t > 0, so a price taker located at x on the line incurs
a total cost of tx + la if she buys from ¯rm a and t(1 ¡ x) + lb if she buys from ¯rm b. The
price takers choose which ¯rm to buy from to minimize this cost (randomizing in the event of a
tie). We restrict ¹ > 0 to ensure that there are always some price takers for whom the ¯rms set
posted prices.
The other 1 ¡ ¹ 2 (0; 1) consumers are `bargainers'.3 We assume that the bargainers have
no transport costs, i.e., they view the products as homogeneous, or at least of equal value, so
they are entirely price-focused. After the ¯rms have set their posted prices, these consumers ask
for second quotes. A proportion q 2 (0; 1) of the bargainers randomly select just one of the two
¯rms for a second quote. One could interpret these as `unskilled' bargainers. The remainder
ask both ¯rms for a second quote: we can think of these as `skilled' bargainers. Note that the
bargainers are doing more than searching; they are actively inviting sellers to beat their publicly
posted prices.
The assumption that the bargainers see the goods as perfectly substitutable is technically
convenient. It allows us tractably to determine the optimal distribution of second quotes which
sellers should o®er, even given non-identical posted prices. The assumption also bears a clear
economic interpretation. We can think of the price takers as consumers who su®er signi¯cant
bargaining and switching costs, which could be entirely psychological or due to a lack of informa-
tion.4 Given the consumers always purchase one unit, Hotelling transport costs are equivalent
to a switching cost of 2t ¯¯12 ¡ x
¯¯. The bargainers, by contrast, are entirely price-focused, and
to get the best price they are willing to bargain with at least one seller. Desai and Purohit
(2004) and Lal and Rao (1997) similarly assume that, respectively, hagglers (who behave like
our bargainers) and cherry-pickers (who search for supermarket price promotions) have lower
transport costs than other consumers.
If a ¯rm is asked to o®er a better price it is ignorant of whether the particular bargainer is
also approaching the rival ¯rm for a second quote. Given the posted prices are binding, the ¯rm
can make a bargained o®er of any price p ¸ 0 weakly lower than its posted price. The bargained
price the ¯rm quotes is assumed to be a ¯nal take-it-or-leave-it o®er to this consumer, so the
3To preserve tractability, we assume that the proportion of bargainers is given exogenously and conduct
comparative statics with respect to this proportion. The bargaining behavior we model would be the endogenous
outcome of a consumer optimization problem if we introduced explicit costs of bargaining. Such an extension
adds much complication, and we conjecture that as in Gill and Thanassoulis (2009) our qualitative results would
remain unchanged.
4The psychological embarrassment of starting a negotiation and lack of information that discounts are available
can explain bargaining costs. See Burnham et al. (2003) for a discussion of psychological and informational
switching costs.
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¯rm cannot lower price further.5 A skilled bargainer who asks both ¯rms for a second quote
buys at the lower of the two quotes, randomizing if the quoted prices are the same. An unskilled
bargainer who asks just ¯rm i for a second quote buys from ¯rm i if the quoted price is lower
than or matches ¯rm j0s posted price, and otherwise buys from ¯rm j at its posted price lj .
Each ¯rm therefore has two strategic marketing decisions to make. The ¯rst is to decide
what posted price to set, which will determine demand from the price takers and also set an
upper bound on the prices that can be quoted to bargainers (as the bargainers can always buy
at the posted price). The second strategic marketing choice faced by the ¯rms is how to bargain:
should a ¯rm be invited to o®er a better price by a bargainer, it must decide what price to o®er.
The ¯rms seek to maximize their expected pro¯ts. The model's parameters ft; ¹; qg and payo®
functions are all common knowledge, as are the posted prices once they have been set. Where
possible we restrict attention to pure strategies.
3 Strategic Bargaining
To determine the optimal marketing approach we must analyze optimal bargaining and strategic
pricing together as they will have competitive feedback e®ects on each other. This section
determines the optimal bargaining strategy as a function of the posted prices which have been set.
In other words given the market parameters (proportion of bargainers, propensity to approach
multiple ¯rms for second quotes) what reductions in price, if any, should a ¯rm consider o®ering
to bargainers as part of its marketing mix?
Suppose that the ¯rms have set positive posted prices la and lb with l ´ min fla; lbg. The
price l acts as an upper bound on the prices that are quoted to bargainers by either ¯rm. If
a seller with li > lj should refuse to lower its price to at least the rival's price lj = l when
requested to beat its own posted price then it will fail to sell to any of the bargainers. If instead
it were to o®er a price of l then it would at least make sales to those bargainers who approach it
for a second quote but don't approach its rival. Thus optimal bargaining will require the ¯rms
to at least match the lowest posted price.
Furthermore refusing to o®er prices below l to the bargainers cannot be part of the optimal
bargaining strategy. If a ¯rm adopted this strategy then her rival would bargain by just un-
dercutting her when a second quote was requested. In fact, the bargaining stage cannot have a
pure strategy equilibrium in which a ¯rm always o®ers bargainers the same price. Such a price
is either too low and should be raised (which increases pro¯ts from those bargainers who do
not approach the rival ¯rm) or would be undercut by the rival ¯rm to win the business of those
bargainers who seek two second quotes. Unless a ¯rm can commit in advance to deny her sales
5Our simple bargaining model is tractable and re°ects real-world bargaining in that bargainers actively ap-
proach a seller to ask for a better price than the one posted, di®erent bargainers approach di®erent numbers of
sellers and (as shown below) bargained prices are random.
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force the discretion to lower prices (analyzed in Section 7), active bargaining in which prices are
lowered with some probability must be part of the optimal bargaining mix.
Proposition 1 [Optimal Bargaining Strategy]
There is a unique symmetric equilibrium bargaining strategy.6 Each ¯rm stands ready to
lower prices to bargainers, but to an unpredictable extent. Under the optimal strategy:
1. Both ¯rms choose to o®er bargainers second quoted prices p lying in the range
h
lq
2¡q ; l
i
.
When l > 0, the price o®ers are drawn from the distribution F (p) = 1¡ (l¡p)q2p(1¡q) .
2. Average bargained prices are given by lq and each ¯rm makes pro¯ts of ¼i = (1¡¹)lq2 from
the bargainers.
3. Average bargained prices and pro¯ts from the bargainers grow if the lowest posted price,
l, rises or if bargainers become less skilled, approaching both ¯rms for a second quote less
frequently (q rises).
In equilibrium the ¯rms must trade o® the incentive to o®er high prices to maximize pro¯t
from the bargainers who don't approach the rival against the incentive to price low to win
the business of bargainers who also approach the rival ¯rm for a second quote. Part 1 of
Proposition 1 demonstrates that this trade-o® yields price choices drawn from a distribution
F (p). Di®erentiating this entity allows us to characterize the probability density function of
second quoted prices as f(p) = lq=2p2(1¡q). Recall that the ¯rms' marginal costs are normalized
to zero, so f(p) should be interpreted as the probability of lowering the margin above cost from
l to p when pressed to improve on the posted prices by a consumer. This density function can be
readily calculated for any given parameter values. For example the probability of various ranges
of percentage discounts o®ered relative to l is given by Figure 1 when half of the bargainers are
skilled and half unskilled (q = 1=2).
The optimal bargaining strategy has, perhaps surprisingly, larger reductions in margin being
o®ered more frequently than smaller ones. Equilibrium, and so optimality, requires that a
bargaining ¯rm must be indi®erent between all the prices which it will o®er with some probability
to bargainers demanding a second quote. Therefore the ¯rm is indi®erent to lowering the
bargained price by some small amount. When the initial price is near l, the initial probability of
a sale is low, while the price reduction will generate a lot of extra pro¯t from any extra sale to
bargainers. When instead the initial price is low, the initial sale probability starts higher, while
the price reduction would generate much more modest extra pro¯ts from any extra sale. As the
¯rm must be indi®erent to either price change, the increase in the probability of a sale must be
greater when lowering price from a low level as compared to a high level. This is equivalent to
6In fact there can be no asymmetric equilibrium. The proof works by showing that the two ¯rms' pricing
distributions have to be continuous on the same connected support with a supremum at l. The details are
laborious and hence omitted, but it is then straightforward to establish symmetry.
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saying that high prices must be quoted by the ¯rm's rival less frequently, and so generates the
shape of margin reductions given in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Percentage discounts when q = 12
Notes: When interpreting Figure 1, recall that we have normalized marginal cost to zero: the reductions should
thus be thought of as percentage discounts o®ered o® the margin a ¯rm makes above marginal cost when selling
at l. The ¯nal bin (65% to 70% reduction in margin) has a lower probability than the previous bin because the
support of the pricing distribution ends somewhere within this bin.
Next consider Parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 1. When the lower of the posted prices takes
a higher value (l is higher) the bargainers' outside option becomes less valuable, allowing the
¯rms to bargain to higher prices on average as the posted prices impose less of a constraint on
pricing. The posted prices will therefore be set strategically: we turn to this analysis in the
next section. When the bargainers seek a single quote with higher probability, so q is higher
and bargainers are less skilled, there is a greater incentive to price high to pro¯t from bargainers
who have not approached the rival ¯rm, pushing up the o®ered prices.7 A higher q also raises
average bargained prices because unskilled bargainers pay higher prices in expectation for a
given pricing distribution: they only receive one draw from F (p), while the skilled bargainers
pay the lower of two draws. As the market is always covered in our Hotelling framework with
all consumers buying one unit, higher bargained prices translate directly into higher pro¯ts for
7The bargained pricing distribution for a higher l or q ¯rst-order stochastically dominates that for a lower l or
q.
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the ¯rms from the bargainers.
4 Competitive Posted Prices
We now turn to the marketing decision of what posted price to set. The ¯rms will decide this
strategically as di®erent posted prices have strategic implications for price takers and alter the
bargaining pro¯ts which can be made. Thus to determine optimal pricing we must build on the
bargaining analysis of Section 3.
If the ¯rms considered only the price takers, the equilibrium posted price would be l¤ = t as
prices would be set just as in the standard Hotelling model. The ¯rms, however, are of course
aware of the impact of the posted prices on the expected pro¯ts they make from the bargainers.
Strategic considerations then yield a continuum of possible outcomes.
Proposition 2 [Competitive Posted Prices]
Posted prices in excess of the Hotelling competitive level of t are optimal. In particular:
1. The competing ¯rms set the same posted price: all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the
posted price setting stage are symmetric.
2. There is a continuum of possible posted price equilibria l¤ given by
l¤ 2
·
t;
µ
1 + q
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t
¸
: (1)
3. The top of the pricing range grows as the proportion of bargainers increases (¹ falls) and
as the bargainers become less skilled (q rises).
Proposition 2 demonstrates that in markets in which some consumers bargain, the optimal
pricing strategy is to raise posted prices above the level that standard Hotelling competition
for the price takers would deliver. At these high prices a ¯rm could increase its pro¯ts from
price takers by undercutting the rival: the increase in market share would outweigh the loss
in inframarginal revenues. However lowering the posted price would allow bargainers a better
outside option { thus the bargained prices would fall and so pro¯ts would be lost on bargainers
(Proposition 1). This concern allows the ¯rms to forgo the price war for the price takers and
maintain equilibrium posted prices above t. Pro¯ts from the bargainers increase when the
bargainers become less skilled or the proportion of bargainers rises (Proposition 1), thus reducing
the incentive to undercut the rival's posted price and allowing the range of equilibria to expand.
As the proportion of bargainers tends to zero, so ¹ ! 1, the top of the pricing range falls to the
standard Hotelling price t.
We have yet to explain however why a range of posted prices can be supported. Why are
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high prices not guaranteed?8 The reason here is that ¯rms have a `kinked pro¯t curve'. Suppose
that a rival sets a posted price above t but below the maximum that can be supported as an
equilibrium. Undercutting this price is not optimal by the reasoning above. However raising
posted prices above the level of a rival is never optimal. If a ¯rm were to raise its posted price
higher than the rival's, pro¯ts would be lost on the price takers. In addition no pro¯ts would be
gained from the bargainers as the lowest posted price, l, would not change. Bargainers see the
products as undi®erentiated as they are price-focused, and so can use the rival's posted price
as a credible outside option. Thus the lowest posted price is the relevant variable o® which
bargained prices are negotiated, and this outside option cannot be raised by one ¯rm acting
alone.
5 Prices, Pro¯ts and Consumer Surplus
We have established that in a market in which ¯rms set posted prices and yet some consumers
bargain, the optimal marketing mix requires competing ¯rms to set identical posted prices lying
within a given range (Proposition 2) and then to o®er reductions of a non-predictable size to
bargainers (Proposition 1). We are therefore now in a position to analyze how equilibrium pro¯ts
from this market will vary with the market parameters.
To conduct this comparative statics exercise we introduce a parameter ® 2 (0; 1] which
measures the degree of coordination the ¯rms manage to achieve.9 Speci¯cally, we assume that
the ¯rms set an equilibrium posted price of
l¤ (®) =
µ
1 + ®q
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t; (2)
so the ¯rms achieve a proportion ® of the maximum possible increase above the standard
Hotelling price t which Proposition 2 allows. From Part 2 of Proposition 1, each ¯rm makes
pro¯ts of (1¡ ¹)ql¤=2 from the bargainers. As the market is always covered, and ¯rms set the
same posted price in equilibrium, the ¯rms share the proportion ¹ of price takers at price l¤.
Thus, using (2), the expected overall pro¯ts of each ¯rm will be:
¦i(®; q; ¹; t) = ¹2
µ
1 + ®q
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t
| {z }
Pro¯t fromprice takers
+(1¡ ¹) q2
µ
1 + ®q
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t
| {z }
Pro¯t frombargainers
: (3)
Equation (3) is an important step as it allows us to capture equilibrium pro¯tability in a
market in which ¯rms compete with the optimal marketing mix of posted prices and subsequent
8The range of equilibria we ¯nd has parallels in the price-matching guarantee literature (see e.g., Chen, 1995
and Moorthy and Winter, 2006).
9If ® = 0; l¤ = t for any ¹, so the posted prices are not a®ected by the proportion of bargainers, and hence
neither are the bargained prices from Proposition 1.
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bargaining strategy.
Proposition 3 [Firm Pro¯ts and Consumer Surplus]
In equilibrium, each ¯rm's pro¯ts are given by (3) and are:
1. Increasing in the degree of coordination ® achieved by the ¯rms.
2. Decreasing in bargainers' skill. That is pro¯ts rise in the propensity with which bargainers
ask only one ¯rm for a second quote, q.
Furthermore:
3. Consumer surplus moves in the opposite direction to ¯rm pro¯ts and to average prices.
The competing ¯rms in our market are striving to maximize pro¯ts gained from two separate
groups of consumers: the price takers and the bargainers. Increased coordination allows greater
pro¯ts to be made on both consumer types. If the ¯rms succeed in coordinating on the same
high posted price (high ®) within the equilibrium range found in Proposition 2, neither ¯rm loses
price taker market share to the other and each ¯rm serves half the price taker market at a high
price. At the same time bargainers secure reductions o® high posted prices and so pro¯ts from
these consumers are also high (Proposition 1). Bigger pro¯ts immediately imply that consumer
surplus must fall given the market is covered.
When the bargainers become less skilled, pro¯ts from both types of consumer also rise. For
a given degree of coordination, (2) shows that the equilibrium posted price increases in the
proportion of bargainers who request a second quote from a single ¯rm, q. This is because
a higher q raises the pro¯ts from the bargainers (Proposition 1), which in turn reduces the
incentive to undercut a rival's posted price as the pro¯t gain from the price takers becomes
smaller relative to the foregone pro¯ts from the bargainers. The increase in the equilibrium
posted price directly increases pro¯ts from the price takers and also leads to higher bargained
prices.
6 Encouraging Consumer Bargaining and Marketing Policy
We now move beyond the question of the optimal marketing mix of posted price setting and
bargaining; instead we turn to the wider question of whether encouraging consumers to bargain,
or the opposite, should form part of the ¯rms' broader marketing strategy. The same question
could be put to national competition authorities and consumer champions, though their objec-
tives are (presumably) the reverse of that of the ¯rms. So would consumers or ¯rms gain from
an increase in the proportion of bargainers?
On the one hand bargainers pay lower prices than price takers, so one might imagine that
increasing the number of bargainers would improve consumer outcomes. This has certainly been
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the view of the UK competition authority. In 2004 the UK's O±ce of Fair Trading launched an
information campaign to advertise the bene¯ts of bargaining in the UK estate agency (realtor)
market:
\We will therefore undertake an information campaign to raise consumer aware-
ness of the bene¯ts of shopping around before choosing an estate agent and of nego-
tiating fee rates." (Section 1.12, O±ce of Fair Trading, 2004)
The rationale for this campaign was that:
\Greater shopping around and negotiation by consumers will increase competitive
pressures on estate agents and result in better value for money in terms of both lower
prices and higher service quality." (Section 1.12, O±ce of Fair Trading, 2004)
However such a conclusion is not clear. As the proportion of bargainers increases we will
show that posted prices rise. Hence bargainers receive a reduction, but from a higher level. Thus
it is quite possible that average prices could rise, and consumer surplus fall, as the proportion of
bargainers increases. In this light it is interesting to note that policymakers sometimes do try to
limit bargaining: until 2001 the Rabattgesetz (statute on discounts) and the Zugabeverordnung
(regulation governing free gifts with sales) severely restricted the ability of German retailers to
o®er discounts o® posted prices (Finger and Schmieder, 2005, Korn, 2007).
6.1 The Comparative Statics of Changes in the Bargaining Population
In this section we analyze how a change in the proportion of bargainers a®ects prices for both
bargainers and price takers. Our result splits the consumers into three camps: those who remain
price takers; those who were already bargaining; and those who swap from taking prices as given
to asking for discounts.
Proposition 4 [Prices and the Proportion of Bargainers]
As the proportion of bargainers increases (¹ goes down):
1. The equilibrium posted price increases, so the remaining price takers pay more.
2. The expected bargained price increases, so the existing bargainers pay more.
3. If the proportion of consumers who switch to bargaining is su±ciently small, the new
bargainers pay less on average.
As we increase the proportion of bargainers, the incentive to keep the posted prices high to
make the bargainers' outside option less attractive goes up as the price takers impose less of a
constraint on pricing. The higher equilibrium posted price hurts the price takers directly: this
is captured by the ¯rst result above. In addition, however, the higher posted price forces up the
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average price o®ered to bargainers from the distribution of second quotes. Thus the consumers
who remain price takers as well as those who were already bargaining become worse o®. Of
course, bargainers expect to receive a discount o® the posted price, so those consumers who
switch to bargaining get a better price on average as long as not too many consumers switch
so the equilibrium posted price does not rise too much. We consider the overall impact of the
proportion of bargainers on pro¯ts and consumer surplus in Section 6.3.
6.2 How Would a Firm Alter the Proportion of Bargainers?
Before proceeding we ¯rst address how a ¯rm (or competition authority) might hope to alter
the proportion of bargainers in the population.
Empirical evidence from a number of sources (see the Introduction) shows that in numerous
markets some consumers bargain while others do not. Psychological and informational costs
may deter consumers from bargaining, so to the extent that ¯rms can reduce the embarrassment
of bargaining and make it more widely known that discounts are available, the proportion of
bargainers should increase. Let us consider how ¯rms might in°uence the psychological costs of
bargaining. Consumers may be more inclined to bargain if ¯rms employ a greater proportion of
more senior or better trained sales sta® who are perceived as more likely to have the authority to
o®er a discount. Consumers may also feel that bargaining is more acceptable when the number
of retail sta® is higher, so the negotiation does not inconvenience other shoppers as much. The
propensity of consumers to bargain will also be a®ected by social norms: in certain industries
bargaining below a posted price is a well-established and acceptable norm of behavior.10 Over
time, ¯rms may be able to induce a culture of bargaining in their industry; indeed, there may
be a snowball e®ect whereby initial increases in the proportion of bargainers encourage more
reticent consumers to join in, thus creating a new norm.
6.3 Who Wants Bargainers?
We now turn to the question of when it is in the ¯rms' interest to try to increase the proportion
of bargainers. To abstract from the complications involved in analyzing potential competition
between ¯rms to attract more bargainers, we consider only how a generalized increase in the
proportion of bargainers a®ects the ¯rms jointly. To simplify, we also abstract from any costs
directly incurred in attempting to in°uence this proportion.
Lemma 1 Firm pro¯ts are convex in the proportion of bargainers. The pro¯ts are maximized
when everyone bargains and no one is a price taker, i.e., as ¹ ! 0.
10See for example the discussion of the UK car market in Section 1. Drozdenko and Jensen (2005, p.264) note
that discounting is a®ected by industry convention and historical precedent. Zettelmeyer et al. (2006) consider the
impact of online referral services such as Autobytel.com which request quotes from dealers on behalf of automobile
buyers.
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Hence if ¯rms' ability to alter the proportion of bargainers was unrestrained, and further
if alterations in the proportion of bargainers didn't alter the bargaining skill of consumers or
the degree of coordination between ¯rms (q and ®), then ¯rms would want all consumers to
bargain and none to be price takers. From the perspective of a consumer surplus focused
competition authority, this would be the worst possible outcome. If everyone is a bargainer then
there are essentially no lost pro¯ts from refusing to undercut a rival's posted price. Hence the
downward force on prices is removed and ¯rms can set posted prices with a view to weakening
the bargainers. This allows posted prices to rise as high as consumers' full willingness to pay for
the item { competition imposes no restraint. And pro¯ts from bargainers grow as the posted
prices grow from Proposition 1.
However the convexity of pro¯ts in the proportion of bargainers (Lemma 1) implies that
pro¯ts do not change monotonically in the proportion of bargainers, 1¡ ¹. This is because of
the con°icting e®ects of raising the proportion of bargainers described in Proposition 4: posted
prices rise, which hurts existing bargainers and the remaining price takers, while those who switch
to bargaining now receive a discount. Further the ¯rms' ability to manipulate the proportion
of bargainers is likely to be constrained: consumer behavior can be changed by degrees and not
immediately moved to some entirely new practice. Hence when would an incremental increase
in the proportion of bargainers be a part of an optimal ¯rm marketing policy?
The convexity of pro¯ts established in Lemma 1 implies that there is a pro¯t minimizing,
consumer surplus maximizing, proportion of bargainers. This key proportion of price takers
is given explicitly by ¹^ in Proposition 5, which shows that if the proportion of price takers is
reduced incrementally from a level above ¹^ then pro¯ts will decline due to the convexity of
pro¯ts, while if the proportion of price takers starts below ¹^ pro¯ts rise (the consumer surplus
results are reversed).
Proposition 5 [Incremental Bargaining Proportions]
Pro¯ts are lowest, and consumer surplus highest, if the proportion of price takers in the
population is given by
¹^ = min
(s
®q2
(1¡ q) (1¡ ®q) ; 1
)
: (4)
Thus:
1. A small reduction in the proportion of price takers, ¹, increases ¯rm pro¯ts and reduces
consumer surplus if there are fewer price takers than ¹^.
2. A small reduction in the proportion of price takers, ¹, reduces ¯rm pro¯ts and increases
consumer surplus if there are more price takers than ¹^.
3. If bargainers become less skilled (q rises) or the degree of coordination achieved by the ¯rms
goes up (® rises), then ¹^ increases so the pro¯t minimizing, consumer surplus maximizing
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point occurs with fewer bargainers.
It follows from Proposition 5 that incrementally increasing the proportion of bargainers is in
the ¯rms' interests (and hurts the consumers) if the current proportion of price takers is below ¹^.
Thus the critical level ¹^ is key to answering the question \who wants more bargainers?" Part 3 of
Proposition 5 addresses how ¹^ varies with the model parameters. Suppose ¯rst that bargainers
become less e®ective at negotiating discounts as they tend to ask for fewer second quotes (q
rises). The ¯rms now bene¯t more strongly from the presence of the bargainers in the market
as bargained pro¯ts rise (Proposition 1), which acts to push up the posted prices (see (2)).
Thus when the proportion of bargainers rises, the discounts secured by the new bargainers more
quickly become overwhelmed by the higher prices faced by existing price takers and bargainers.
As a result pro¯ts rise and consumer surplus falls even at high initial levels of price taking: that
is ¹^ rises. Similar reasoning applies if coordination, ®, increases.
Of course, if the ¯rms or a competition authority were successful in changing the proportion
of bargainers they might also indirectly a®ect the average `bargaining skill' of consumers, q, and
the degree of coordination achieved by the ¯rms, ®. The direction in which these might move
is somewhat ambiguous. For example consider the variable q. Inducing more bargaining by
making it easier for consumers may, on the one hand, stimulate more of those consumers who
were already bargaining to source quotes from both ¯rms; on the other hand a high proportion
of the price takers who are induced to start bargaining might ask for a single quote. It is clear,
however, that an increase in q always raises prices and pro¯ts: from (2) the equilibrium posted
price rises in q, as do pro¯ts from bargainers from Proposition 1. Thus the ¯rms might also
pursue strategies to increase q directly: for example, if the ¯rms locate their stores further apart,
they are likely to increase q as it will be more costly for bargainers to source quotes from both
¯rms. Proposition 5 allows us to gain insight without having to take a stand on this issue by
analyzing the benchmark case where q and ® are constant.
Proposition 5 makes clear that in the absence of some market analysis competition authorities
should be wary of encouraging bargaining in markets as increasing the proportion of bargainers
will often have the perverse e®ect of raising average prices and lowering consumer surplus. The
naive policy prescription that increasing bargaining is good because it increases competitive
pressure on ¯rms and leads to more discounts can be counterproductive.
7 How Much Bargaining Discretion Should Firms Allow?
So far we have studied the optimal marketing policy for competing ¯rms when some consumers
bargain while others accept the posted prices, assuming that the ¯rms are not able to commit
to restricting the discounts that their sales sta® can o®er. We now embed our earlier results
into an analysis of how much discretion a ¯rm should give its sales sta® to o®er discounts below
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posted prices when some degree of commitment is possible. We consider two possibilities. A
¯rm can: (a) allow its sales sta® full discretion to bargain (as modeled above); or (b) restrict
its sales sta® to only be able to match the rival's posted price if approached by a bargaining
consumer.11 Both of these approaches are common - yet their overall impact on competition
is di±cult to capture without a model like ours which endogenizes bargaining strategies and
posted price choices.
7.1 The Dynamic Bargaining/Price Matching Game
To conduct the analysis, we assume that each ¯rm's sales sta® are appropriately incentivized
so that they wish to maximize ¯rm pro¯ts, and we formulate the following two stage dynamic
bargaining/price matching game.
1. The two ¯rms decide simultaneously how much discretion to allow their sales sta®. Each
¯rm can decide to either:
(a) Bargain (BA), which means that the ¯rm allows its sales sta® full discretion to o®er
discounts (as per the model analyzed in Sections 3 to 6); or
(b) Price match (PM), which means that if a consumer requests a discount, the ¯rm's sales
sta® match the rival's posted price by o®ering the consumer the lower of the two ¯rms'
posted prices l, but never o®er further reductions.12
Each ¯rm becomes aware of its rival's sales sta® discretion choice. We let (BA,BA),
(PM,PM), (BA,PM) and (PM,BA) represent, respectively, both ¯rms bargaining, both
¯rms price matching, ¯rm i bargaining and j price matching, and the reverse.
2. Given the sales sta® discretion choices of the ¯rms, they simultaneously set posted prices.
The consumers behave as outlined in Section 2, where a proportion q of bargainers approach
just one ¯rm for a second quote.
7.2 Pricing and Pro¯ts Given Bargaining Discretion Choices
Before we can analyze the equilibrium choices of how much bargaining discretion to allow, we
must ¯rst determine the pricing and pro¯t implications of the di®erent possible constellations
of bargaining discretion choices.
11We do not consider ¯rms committing to rigid posted prices. As bargainers select only on price, a refusal to
match even a rival's posted price will mean the loss of all bargainers to a rival who sets a lower posted price.
Further, if both ¯rms chose to stick to rigid posted prices, the incentive to "-undercut the rival's posted price to
gain all the bargainers means that there could be no pure strategy equilibrium at the posted price setting stage.
12If a ¯rm's sales sta® were given discretion to o®er any price between their own posted price and a rival's lower
posted price, they would always choose to price match to avoid losing all the bargainers.
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7.2.1 Both Firms Bargain
This case has been solved as the benchmark model. Proposition 2 gives the range of equilibrium
posted prices as
l¤(BA,BA) 2
·
t;
µ
1 + q
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t
¸
: (5)
Assuming a degree of coordination ®, from (3) ¯rm pro¯ts can be simpli¯ed to:
¦(BA,BA)i =
1
2
³
1¡ (1¡ ¹) (1¡ q)
´µ
1 + ®q
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t: (6)
7.2.2 Both Firms Price Match
Lemma 2 If both ¯rms choose to price match then they set identical equilibrium posted prices
lying in the range
l¤(PM;PM) 2
·
t;
µ
1 +
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t
¸
(7)
and all bargainers transact at the posted prices, splitting themselves equally between the sellers.
Assuming a degree of coordination ®, each ¯rm's pro¯ts equal
¦(PM;PM)i =
1
2
µ
1 + ®
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t (8)
so when both ¯rms price match, pro¯ts are higher than when both ¯rms bargain.
If both ¯rms strategically decide to price match then when bargainers request a better quote
from either seller they will be o®ered the lower of the two posted prices. Hence the ¯rms split the
bargaining population between them and serve them at the lowest posted price l. For a given l,
this implies that pro¯ts can be extracted from bargainers more e®ectively than when both ¯rms
bargain as bargaining ¯rms o®er discounts of (1¡ q)l on average (see Part 2 of Proposition 1).
Turning to the posted price choice, each ¯rm must trade o® the pro¯t to be gained from
price takers when undercutting the rival's posted price against the pro¯ts lost from bargainers
by lowering the best posted price. From above, bargaining consumers are more pro¯table when
both ¯rms price match than when both ¯rms bargain, so the incentive to undercut the rival's
posted price is weakened. It follows that higher posted prices can be sustained when both ¯rms
price match: the range of possible equilibrium posted prices (7) grows relative to (5), so price
matching moderates competition between the ¯rms. Because price matching allows both higher
posted prices and smaller discounts o® these prices, price matching ¯rms earn higher pro¯ts
than bargaining ¯rms.
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7.2.3 One Firm Bargains and the Other Price Matches
Lemma 3 If one ¯rm bargains and its rival price matches then the ¯rms set identical equilibrium
posted prices lying in the range
l¤(BA;PM) 2
·
t;
µ
1 + q
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t
¸
: (9)
All bargainers transact at the posted prices. A proportion q=2 buy from the price matching ¯rm
while the majority (1¡ q=2) buy from the bargaining ¯rm. Assuming a degree of coordination
®, the ¯rms' pro¯ts are given by:
¦(BA;PM)i =
1
2
³
1 + (1¡ ¹) (1¡ q)
´µ
1 + ®q
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t; (10)
¦(BA;PM)j =
1
2
³
1¡ (1¡ ¹) (1¡ q)
´µ
1 + ®q
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t: (11)
Thus the bargaining ¯rm i makes more pro¯t than when both ¯rms bargain, while the price
matching ¯rm j makes the same pro¯t as when both bargain.
Any bargainer who only approaches the price matching ¯rm (a proportion q=2) will be o®ered
the lower of the posted prices, l, and will buy at that price. The bargaining ¯rm will win the
business of all the other bargainers (a proportion 1 ¡ q=2) by just undercutting l (so these
bargainers essentially pay l).
Now consider the question of which posted price to set. The same trade-o® as before persists:
each ¯rm could gain price taker market share by undercutting the rival's posted price, but this
would entail a loss on the bargainers. For the price matching ¯rm, the pro¯t to be made from
the bargainers is given by (1¡ ¹)lq=2, which is identical to the pro¯ts it makes from bargainers
when both ¯rms bargain (in that case the ¯rms share the bargainers, but at a discounted average
price lq). The price matching ¯rm is the one whose incentives to undercut are binding on the
possible equilibrium (the bargaining ¯rm would like to see yet higher posted prices as it makes
more pro¯ts from bargainers). Hence the range of possible posted price equilibria is the same
as in our benchmark model, explaining why (9) matches (5). As the posted price equilibria are
the same as when both ¯rms bargain, and the price matching ¯rm earns the same amount of
pro¯ts from the bargainers, the price matcher makes the same overall pro¯ts as when both ¯rms
bargain. The bargaining ¯rm, however, sells to a greater proportion of bargainers and so does
better than when both ¯rms bargain.
7.3 Equilibrium Bargaining Discretion Choices
Using the pro¯t expressions (6), (8), (10) and (11), we are now in a position to ¯nd the equilibria
of the bargaining/price matching game. Proposition 6 describes the equilibria, while Figure 2
illustrates how the set of equilibria varies in the parameters.
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Proposition 6 [Equilibrium Sales Sta® Discretion Choices]
Assuming a constant degree of coordination ® achieved by the ¯rms, the dynamic bargain-
ing/price matching game has the following pure strategy equilibria:
1. Both ¯rms allowing their sales sta® to bargain (BA,BA) is always an equilibrium.
2. In addition to (BA,BA), both ¯rms price matching (PM,PM) is also an equilibrium when
®¡ ®q(1¡ ¹)¡ ¹ ¸ 0; (12)
that is, when the degree of coordination, ®, is su±ciently high, the proportion of price tak-
ers, ¹, is su±ciently low, or (when ® ¸ ¹) the proportion of bargainers that are unskilled,
q, is su±ciently low.
3. In addition to (BA,BA), the hybrid cases in which one ¯rm bargains and the other price
matches ((BA,PM) and (PM,BA)) are also equilibria when the inequality in (12) is re-
versed.
Proposition 6 demonstrates that both ¯rms bargaining (BA,BA) is always an equilibrium of
the strategic bargaining/price matching game. This is true even though both committing to only
matching the rival's posted price (PM,PM) always returns higher pro¯ts, and is an equilibrium
when (12) holds. If one ¯rm chooses bargaining, its rival can do no better than to allow its sales
sta® to bargain also. If a ¯rm deviated from (BA,BA) by choosing to price match, it would
lose market share among the bargainers. At the same time, competition for bargainers would
become less intense, pushing up bargained prices to the posted prices. These e®ects exactly
cancel and the equilibrium posted prices would be unchanged, so the deviator's pro¯ts would
remain constant (see the discussion of Lemma 3). Neither ¯rm is able unilaterally to coordinate
a move to both price matching (PM,PM), which would moderate competition and allow posted
prices and both ¯rms' pro¯ts to rise. The (BA,BA) equilibrium appears weak, but note that we
have not considered that ¯rms might care about pro¯t and sales volume comparisons: if a ¯rm
deviates from (BA,BA) to price matching its pro¯ts are unchanged, but the other ¯rm gains
bargainer market share and sees its pro¯ts increase.
Part 2 of Proposition 6 shows the conditions under which both ¯rms choosing to price match
(PM,PM) is an equilibrium. Consider a ¯rm thinking about deviating to bargaining. On the
one hand, the deviator gains a bigger share of the bargainers; on the other hand, the equilibrium
posted price falls as the remaining price matching ¯rm has less of an incentive to keep prices
high as it loses bargainer share. When the degree of coordination ® is higher, the proportion of
price takers ¹ is lower or the proportion of bargainers that are unskilled q is lower, the fall in the
posted price from deviation becomes bigger, making deviation less attractive. Because the fall
in the posted price lowers pro¯ts from both price takers and bargainers, this e®ect outweighs
any bargainer share considerations.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium sales sta® discretion choices
Notes: Both ¯rms allowing their sales sta® to bargain (BA,BA) is an equilibrium for all parameter values. The
curves for di®erent values of q mark the boundary between the region in which both ¯rms price matching (PM,PM)
is also an equilibrium and the region in which the hybrid cases (BA,PM) and (PM,BA) are also equilibria.
Finally let's consider the hybrid equilibria (BA,PM) and (PM,BA). We saw above that a
¯rm is indi®erent between both ¯rms bargaining (BA,BA) and the hybrid situation in which
it price matches and the other bargains, so the hybrid equilibria are stable to deviation by the
price matcher. In thinking about deviation, the bargainer in the hybrid cases faces exactly the
reverse incentives as a ¯rm thinking about deviating from the equilibrium in which both ¯rms
price match (PM,PM), so the conditions sustaining the hybrid equilibria are reversed from those
sustaining (PM,PM).
In summary, Proposition 6 shows that both ¯rms giving their sales sta® full discretion
to bargain is always an equilibrium, allowing fully for the impact on posted prices and the
subsequent bargaining strategy. This result holds in the benchmark case in which sales sta® are
incentivized to maximize pro¯ts and a change in bargaining regime does not a®ect the degree
of coordination within the equilibrium range of posted prices that the ¯rms are able to achieve.
However, Proposition 6 also shows that both ¯rms committing in advance to only matching their
rival's posted price can sometimes be sustained as an equilibrium: when the ¯rms play such an
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equilibrium, they succeed in moderating competition and raising pro¯ts. Hybrid equilibria are
also possible. Hence the optimal level of sales sta® discretion depends not only on the market
parameters, but also on the equilibrium the industry is currently in.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze a model of duopoly competition between ¯rms when some consumers
bargain while others buy at the posted prices. The implications for the optimal marketing
strategy of a ¯rm are profound. Perhaps the key insight is that the posted prices set will have
strategic implications for the pro¯ts available from consumers who bargain. Understanding this
insight allows us to address the main questions raised in the Introduction.
We have demonstrated that the presence of bargainers can work to the ¯rms' advantage.
Bargaining consumers will seek reductions o® the posted prices. As a result, high posted prices
allow more pro¯ts to be extracted from the bargainers. Thus the presence of bargainers lowers
the pressure to reduce the posted prices in competition for the price takers. The optimal
marketing mix for a ¯rm facing both price takers and bargainers therefore involves raising the
posted prices from which the bargainers negotiate discounts.
Can any insight be given as to the ¯rms' optimal bargaining strategy? In our model the
answer is clear: bargained reductions should be substantial on average and not predictable. The
reason is that a predictable bargaining strategy will allow the rival ¯rm to always undercut and
steal bargainer business. In numerical simulations reductions of as much as 50% o® margins are
feasible, a fact which for instance ¯ts in with the available evidence for the automobile industry
(Competition Commission (2000)).
If bargainers can be bene¯cial to ¯rms does it follow that an optimal marketing mix should
strive to increase the proportion of consumers who try to bargain? Here the answer is more
nuanced. It does follow, in our model, that if almost all consumers try to bargain then ¯rm pro¯ts
are maximized. This is because the competitive pressure is taken o® the posted prices, allowing
these to rise as high as valuations allow so more pro¯ts can be extracted from bargainers.
However, incrementally increasing the proportion of bargainers need not raise pro¯ts. While
posted prices and average bargained prices rise, the new bargainers swap a high posted price
for a lower bargained price. Nevertheless pro¯ts are likely to increase if many bargainers are
unskilled or if the coordination achievable on high posted prices is great enough.
An important question faced by all ¯rms in designing their business and marketing strategy
is how much discretion to leave their sales force to lower prices to clinch a deal. We show that
allowing sales sta® to lower prices even below the rival's posted price is indeed equilibrium play.
Perhaps paradoxically, if enough of the consumers seek to bargain then both ¯rms refraining
from bargaining below the best posted price is also an equilibrium, and a more pro¯table one at
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that. When both ¯rms restrict sales sta® to price matching, the heat is taken out of competition
for the bargainers and so pro¯ts rise compared to the equilibrium in which both ¯rms allow their
sales sta® bargaining °exibility.
We have assumed a bargaining formulation which is innovative as compared to much of the
existing marketing research. However the speci¯c sequence of o®ers and counter-o®ers is not
the source of our results. Rather the main driver is the link between the posted prices and
the bargainers' outside option, together with the fact that some consumers are not willing to
bargain, while others are with varying levels of skill. Our bargaining formulation is, we believe,
realistic and allows a comparatively rich set of results when set against the extant literature on
this topic.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that l = minfli; ljg > 0. We start by showing that any
symmetric equilibrium must be mixed with: (i) no mass points in the density function; (ii)
F (p) < 1 for p < l; and (iii) F (l) = 1.
(i) If there were a mass point at price p > 0, a ¯rm could deviate pro¯tably by lowering its
quote price to p ¡ " > 0 just below the mass point whenever it would have proposed p. This
increases total sales by a discrete amount (when the bargainer also gets a quote of p from the
rival ¯rm) in return for a vanishingly small loss and so is a pro¯table deviation. If there were a
mass point at p = 0, a ¯rm would deviate upward to sell at a strictly positive price to bargainers
who approach it but not the rival for a second quote.
(ii) Suppose that the support of F stops at p < l. From (i) the probability that the rival
¯rm quotes this highest price is zero. Thus any ¯rm charging the highest price could deviate
pro¯tably by raising price towards l as in either case the ¯rm will make the sale if and only if
the bargainer doesn't also approach the rival ¯rm for second quote.13
(iii) F (l) = 1 as we argued in the second paragraph of Section 3 that the ¯rms will never
price above l.
Properties (i) to (iii) allow us to write a ¯rm's expected pro¯ts from the proportion 1¡¹ of
bargainers at any quoted price p in the support of F as
¼i (p) = (1¡ ¹) p
³q
2 + (1¡ q) (1¡ F (p))
´
: (13)
This follows because of the q proportion of bargainers who ask for just one quote, half will
approach a particular ¯rm and of those all will buy at p, while all those who ask for two quotes
will buy at p if and only if the rival does not o®er them a better quote (from (i) the rival ¯rm
13Even if the density is zero at the highest price in the support of the distribution, by continuity pro¯t at this
price must be the same as for prices in the interior of the mixing distribution.
22
will never o®er the same quote). At the top of the pricing distribution (p = l) we have
¼i(l) = (1¡ ¹) lq2 : (14)
For the ¯rms to be willing to randomize, their pro¯ts must be constant at all points in the
support of F , so
(1¡ ¹) lq
2 = (1¡ ¹) p
³q
2 + (1¡ q) (1¡ F (p))
´
(15)
, F (p) = 1¡ (l ¡ p)q2p (1¡ q) : (16)
To ¯nd the lower bound of the distribution set F ¡p¢ = 0 and solve for p: When l = 0, at least
one ¯rm has li = 0 and so is forced to o®er p = l = 0. The rival can do no better than to also
o®er p = l = 0, so F (l) = F (0) = 1 and (14) remains valid. This concludes Part 1.
For Part 2, let E(p) be the average bargained price across both types of bargainer. As the
market is covered, and each ¯rm earns the same expected pro¯t from the bargainers, each ¯rm
earns ¼i = E(p)2 per bargainer on average. As the ¯rms' pro¯ts are constant at all prices in the
support of the pricing distribution, using (14) each ¯rm's pro¯t from the bargainers is given by
¼i = (1¡ ¹) E[p]2 =
(1¡ ¹) lq
2 (17)
and so E[p] = lq. Part 3 then follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given la and lb the indi®erent price taker on the Hotelling line is at
a location x such that x = 12 + lb¡la2t : Thus ¯rm i's demand from the proportion ¹ > 0 of price
takers is given by
Di (li; lj) = ¹min
½
1;max
½1
2 +
lj ¡ li
2t ; 0
¾¾
(18)
and pro¯t from the price takers is liDi (li; lj). From (14), expected pro¯t from the bargainers is
given by
¼i(li; lj) = (1¡ ¹)minfli; ljgq2 : (19)
Given lj ; ¯rm i will never set li ¸ lj + t. By doing so it receives no demand from the price
takers, while by setting li 2 (lj ; lj + t) pro¯t from any bargainers is the same as when li ¸ lj + t
and pro¯t from the price takers is strictly positive. Furthermore, if feasible ¯rm i will never set
li < lj ¡ t as by doing so pro¯t from any bargainers is strictly lower than setting li = lj ¡ t and
pro¯t from the price takers is also strictly lower as demand stays at ¹. Thus we can restrict
attention to li 2 [lj ¡ t; lj + t), and hence we can write ¯rm i's expected total pro¯ts as
¦i (li; lj) = (1¡ ¹)min fli; ljg q2 + ¹li
µ1
2 +
lj ¡ li
2t
¶
: (20)
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When li < lj ; using (20):
@¦i (li; lj)
@li =
(1¡ ¹) q
2 +
¹ (t+ lj ¡ 2li)
2t ; (21)
@2¦i (li; lj)
@l2i
= ¡¹t < 0: (22)
When li > lj :
@¦i (li; lj)
@li =
¹ (t+ lj ¡ 2li)
2t ; (23)
@2¦i (li; lj)
@l2i
= ¡¹t < 0: (24)
Finally, when li = lj the right-hand side derivative is given by (23), the left-hand side derivative
is given by (21), and the right-hand side and left-hand side second derivatives remain equal to
¡¹t < 0.
Now consider symmetric posted prices with li = lj = l. The right-hand side derivative
¹ (t¡ l)
2t T 0 , l S t (25)
while the left-hand side derivative
(1¡ ¹) q
2 +
¹ (t¡ l)
2t T 0 , l S
µ
1 + q
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t: (26)
Thus if l < t, the right-hand side derivative is strictly positive so the ¯rms have a local incentive
to raise price, and hence we cannot have a symmetric equilibrium. If l >
³
1 + q
³
1¡¹
¹
´´
t, the
left-hand side derivative is strictly negative so the ¯rms have a local incentive to lower price and
again we cannot have a symmetric equilibrium. For
l¤ 2
·
t;
µ
1 + q
µ1¡ ¹
¹
¶¶
t
¸
(27)
the right-hand side derivative is weakly negative while the left-hand side derivative is weakly
positive, so the ¯rms do not have a local incentive to deviate. Furthermore, ¯rm i's objective
function is strictly concave when lj = l¤ and (27) holds: from above the second derivatives equal
¡¹t < 0 everywhere and at the kink where li = lj = l¤ the slope of the objective function switches
from being positive to negative. Thus we have a global optimum, so l¤ forms a symmetric
equilibrium, giving Part 2.
For Part 1, we must show that no pure strategy asymmetric equilibrium can exist. Suppose
to the contrary that posted prices 0 · lj < li form an equilibrium. Remembering from above
that li < lj+t, so Di > 0, ¯rm i0s ¯rst-order condition implies that (23) = 0, so we must have li =
1
2 (t+ lj). Thus lj < 12 (t+ lj), which implies lj < t. But then t+ li¡2lj = (t¡ lj)+(li ¡ lj) > 0
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so using (21) @¦j(lj ;li)@lj > 0 and hence ¯rm j would like to increase its posted price.
Part 3 follows immediately from Part 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. Parts 1 and 2 are immediate from (3), which is a strictly increasing
function of ® and q. Part 3 is immediate from the fact that total welfare is constant in a Hotelling
model with all consumers being served with a single unit.
Proof of Proposition 4. For Part 1 note that the price takers pay the equilibrium posted
price l¤ given by (2). This clearly increases as ¹ decreases. From Part 2 of Proposition 1,
bargainers pay a proportion q < 1 of l¤ on average. Thus Part 2 follows from the fact that l¤
increases as ¹ falls. Furthermore, if the proportion of consumers who switch to bargaining is
su±ciently small, the increase in l¤ will be small enough that the new expected bargained price
will remain below the initial equilibrium posted price, giving Part 3.
Proof of Lemma 1. From (3) ¯rm pro¯ts can be written as
¦i = 12
µ
¹+ ®q(1¡ ¹) + q(1¡ ¹) + ®q2 (1¡ ¹)
2
¹
¶
t: (28)
Di®erentiating this with respect to ¹ yields:
@¦i
@¹ =
1
2
µ
1¡ q (®+ 1) + ®q2
µ
¡ 1¹2 + 1
¶¶
t; (29)
@2¦i
@¹2 =
®q2t
¹3 > 0: (30)
Hence pro¯ts are strictly convex in ¹, and so are also strictly convex in 1¡¹. Finally note that
lim¹!1 ¦i = t2 and lim¹!0 ¦i = 1 , so ¦i is maximized as ¹ ! 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Using (29), @¦i@¹ = 0 if and only if
1¡ q (®+ 1) + ®q2 = ®q
2
¹2 , ¹ =
s
®q2
(1¡ q) (1¡ ®q) : (31)
Given that pro¯ts are strictly convex in the proportion of price takers (see the proof of Lemma 1),
the price-minimizing proportion of price takers is thus given by (4). Parts 1 and 2 then follow
immediately from the convexity of the pro¯t function, remembering that consumer surplus
moves in the opposite direction to pro¯ts given all consumers buy a single unit. Part 3 follows
immediately from (4).
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose the ¯rms set posted prices li and lj . As both ¯rms price match
the bargainers all receive an o®ered price of l = minfli; ljg, and so split themselves equally
between the ¯rms and transact at l. Thus pro¯t from the bargainers is given by (19) with q set
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to 1. The proof of Proposition 2 then extends to show that the ¯rms set identical posted prices
in the range given by (7). As the ¯rms share the price takers at the symmetric equilibrium
posted prices, (8) is then immediate, and (8) is clearly greater than (6).
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose ¯rm i bargains while ¯rm j price matches. Any bargainers who
approach ¯rm j will be o®ered l = minfli; ljg, the price match price. The optimal bargaining
response to this is for ¯rm i to o®er bargainers l ¡ " for some arbitrarily small " > 0. With
this bargaining strategy ¯rm i wins the business of all those bargainers who ask for second
quotes from both ¯rms as well as those who only ask it for a second quote. Thus, the bargainers
all transact at (essentially) the lower posted price l, while the price matching ¯rm j secures
only a proportion q=2 of the bargainers and the bargaining ¯rm i secures a proportion 1¡ q=2.
Conditional on the posted prices, i's pro¯ts are therefore given by the expressions in the proof
of Proposition 2, replacing q=2 with (1 ¡ q=2), while j's are exactly the same as those in the
earlier proof. The proof then extends to show that the ¯rms set identical posted prices in the
range given by (9). The only complication is that i's left-hand side derivative is larger than j's
as 1¡ q=2 > q=2, so it is the price matching ¯rm j whose incentives to deviate downward act as
the binding constraint on the upper bound of the equilibrium price range. The pro¯t expressions
(10) and (11) then follow given the ¯rms share the price takers at the symmetric equilibrium
posted prices. The pro¯t comparisons are immediate from comparing (10) and (11) to (6).
Proof of Proposition 6. From (6) and (11), ¦(BA,BA)j = ¦(BA,PM)j . Hence if ¯rm i is
bargaining then j is indi®erent between bargaining and not, giving Part 1. For Parts 2 and 3
note that from (8) and (10):
¦(PM,PM)i T ¦(BA,PM)i ,
®
¹
µ
1¡ q
³
1 + (1¡ ¹)(1¡ q)
´ ¶
T (1¡ q) (32)
, ®¡ ®q(1¡ ¹)¡ ¹ T 0: (33)
Thus, (PM,PM) is an equilibrium if and only if (12) holds. Furthermore, the bargainer will not
want to deviate from a hybrid equilibrium if and only if the reverse inequality holds, while the
price matcher has no incentive to deviate given ¦(BA,BA)j = ¦(BA,PM)j from above.
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